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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Whether or not money makes the world go around, it is 
certainly the motive force in this case.  Two Delaware 
business entities, Marathon Petroleum Corporation 
(“Marathon”) and Speedway LLC (“Speedway”) (collectively 
“the Companies”), may have a particular pot of money that 
the State of Delaware wants to take.  The companies are 
naturally not eager to assist the State in that effort.  They 
challenge Delaware’s right to conduct an audit examining 
whether certain funds paid for stored-value gift cards issued 
by their Ohio-based subsidiaries (the “Ohio Subsidiaries”) are 
held by Marathon and Speedway and thus subject to 
escheatment.  Their argument relies on Supreme Court 
precedent that lays out a strict order of priority among states 
competing to escheat abandoned property.  Constructed as 
federal common law, that order of priority gives first place to 
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the state where the property owner was last known to reside.  
If that residence cannot be identified or if that state has 
disclaimed its interest in escheating the property, second in 
line for the opportunity to escheat is the state where the 
holder of the abandoned property is incorporated.  Any other 
state is preempted by federal common law from escheating 
the property.  In this case, money left unclaimed by owners of 
the stored-value gift cards is – at least according to Marathon 
and Speedway – held by the Ohio Subsidiaries, and Delaware 
can have no legitimate escheatment claim on the property.  
Marathon and Speedway have therefore filed suit and argue 
that, under the rules of priority and preemption laid down by 
the Supreme Court, Delaware is not permitted to escheat the 
gift-card money.  Therefore, the argument goes, the State 
must also be barred from auditing Marathon and Speedway in 
connection with the gift cards. 
 
Delaware responds that the Companies’ preemption 
claim is not ripe because no action has been taken to enforce 
compliance with the audit and thus participation in the audit 
has been and still is voluntary.  The District Court ruled that 
the dispute is ripe because Marathon and Speedway challenge 
Delaware’s authority to conduct the audit at all.  But the 
Court also concluded that private parties, such as the 
Companies here, cannot invoke the escheatment priority and 
preemption rules laid down by the Supreme Court, so it 
dismissed the Companies’ suit. 
 
 The District Court treated this case with due care and 
admirable skill but, in the end, we disagree with its 
conclusion that private parties cannot invoke federal common 
law to challenge a state’s authority to escheat property.  We 
also have a somewhat different approach to the question of 
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ripeness.  We see two ways to construe Marathon’s and 
Speedway’s arguments.  Viewed one way, their claim is ripe; 
viewed the other, it is not.  More specifically, to the extent the 
Companies are challenging Delaware’s authority to initiate an 
audit in the first instance, the claim is ripe but wrong.  The 
notion that the State cannot conduct any inquiry into 
abandoned property to verify a Delaware corporation’s 
representations regarding abandoned property lacks merit.  
But, to the extent the Companies are challenging the scope or 
means of the examination in this case, the claim is not ripe, 
since the State has taken no formal steps to compel 
compliance with the audit.  Either way, the preemption claim 
was rightly subject to dismissal.1  Nevertheless, we will 
vacate the order of dismissal so that the District Court can 
clarify that dismissal is without prejudice, which may allow 
Marathon and Speedway to bring their claim again at a later 
date, if appropriate. 
 
                                              
1 Marathon and Speedway narrowly argued that Texas 
v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965), and its progeny foreclose 
a state’s ability to examine whether a corporation has 
committed fraud such that property held by its out-of-state 
subsidiaries may be escheated.  They did not clearly argue in 
the alternative that there is a point at which an otherwise 
legitimate state inquiry into the bona fides of a subsidiary 
triggers the priority rules, nor did they develop the factual 
record necessary to assess the merits of such an argument 
such as might have been available had there been an 
enforcement proceeding. 
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I. BACKGROUND2  
 
 A. Marathon and Speedway 
 
 Marathon and Speedway are Delaware corporations 
with their principal places of business in Ohio.  Marathon 
refines, markets, retails, and transports petroleum, and also 
sells its gasoline through independently owned gas stations 
located in the Midwest and Southeast.  Speedway is an 
indirect subsidiary of Marathon and operates gas stations and 
convenience stores.3  “[D]uring the audit period[,]” all of 
Speedway’s stations “were outside of Delaware.”4  (Opening 
Br. at 7.)  The Ohio Subsidiaries are Marathon Prepaid Card 
                                              
2 The District Court granted Delaware’s motion to 
dismiss.  Accordingly, on appeal we “must accept all of the 
complaint’s well pleaded facts as true[.]”  Fowler v. UPMC 
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
3 The exact corporate structure is complicated and not 
entirely clear from the record before us.  The Companies are 
(or were during the audit period) subsidiaries of Marathon Oil 
Corporation.  Marathon Petroleum Corporation (the 
“Marathon” that is the party here) was organized in 2009 as a 
direct subsidiary of Marathon Oil Corporation, but in 2011 it 
was spun off and became a separate, publicly traded 
corporation.  
 
4 That may have changed, but, for purposes of the 
relevant audit period under review, it is enough that 
Speedway did not have any stations in Delaware when this 
case was first filed. 
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LLC and Speedway Prepaid Card LLC.  Their primary 
purpose is to issue non-expiring stored-value gift cards for 
their respective brands.  According to the contracts between, 
on the one hand, Marathon and Speedway and, on the other, 
the Ohio Subsidiaries, the latter are “solely liable and 
obligated for the value of all [c]ards” that they issue.  (App. at 
217, 246.)  Neither of the Ohio Subsidiaries obtain addresses 
of gift card purchasers or recipients, and both “conducted 
business solely outside of Delaware during the audit period.”5  
(Opening Br. at 8.) 
 
 B. The State Escheator 
 
 Like the law of other states, Delaware law presumes 
the right of the State to lay claim to abandoned property.  
Carrying into the present the language of feudal property 
concepts, the exercise of that power is called “escheatment.”  
Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 1101 – 1224 (2017); see also 
Escheat, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (observing 
that, in escheatment, “the state steps in the place of the feudal 
lord, by virtue of its sovereignty, as the original and ultimate 
proprietor of all the lands within its jurisdiction”).  Delaware 
requires corporations organized under its laws to report and 
transfer to the State any property that has not been claimed by 
the property owners for five years.  Id. § 1133(14).6  To 
                                              
5 As far as we know, that is still the case. 
 
6 In February of this year, Delaware revamped its 
escheat statute.  The General Assembly recognized that, “for 
ease of administration and organizational clarity, existing 
subchapters should be struck in their entirety and the statute 
restructured in a more orderly manner[.]”  S.B. 13, 149th 
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enforce that requirement, it has created the office of State 
Escheator under the Department of Finance.  Id. § 1102.  The 
Escheator is permitted, “at reasonable times and on 
reasonable notice, … [to] [e]xamine the records of [a 
corporation] … in order to determine whether the 
[corporation has] complied with” the abandoned property 
laws.  Id. § 1171.  The Escheator has the authority to “[i]ssue 
an administrative subpoena to require that the records … be 
made available for examination,” and may, if necessary, go to 
the Court of Chancery to enforce the subpoena.7  Id.  If the 
Escheator determines that a holder of abandoned property has 
underreported its holdings, the Escheator “shall mail [to the 
holder] a statement of findings and request for payment,” the 
payment amount being the value of the property in question.  
Id. § 1179. 
 
                                                                                                     
Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2017).  In enacting “significant changes 
to the State’s unclaimed property law[,]” id. at Synopsis, the 
legislature decided to limit the look-back period of all audits 
to ten years and to impose a ten-year statute of limitations.  
Id.  The new law also creates a process for companies under 
audit prior to July 22, 2015, which would include the parties 
in this case, to either seek an expedited audit review process 
or participate in a voluntary disclosure program.  Id.  We are 
relying in this opinion on the amended version of the law, 
which is now in effect, and will note changes when relevant. 
 
7 Before the 2017 amendments, it was not clear 
whether the Escheator had the authority to subpoena records.  
The recent statutory changes make that power explicit.  Id. 
§ 1171. 
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The Escheator is permitted to rely on third party 
auditors to conduct an audit, and the vast majority of 
Delaware’s audits are in fact farmed out to an entity called 
Kelmar Associates, LLC.  Kelmar has a financial incentive to 
classify property as escheatable because it is compensated, at 
least in part, based on the value of property that Delaware is 
able to escheat.8   
 
An abandoned property holder receiving the 
Escheator’s request for payment may then choose among the 
following options: (1) pay the amount demanded; (2) pay and 
then seek a refund by filing an action in the Delaware Court 
of Chancery; or (3) refuse to pay and file an action in that 
same court.  Id.  The Court of Chancery reviews the 
Escheator’s factual determination deferentially, taking “due 
account of the experience and specialized competence of the 
State Escheator,” and the court will uphold the Escheator’s 
determination if it was “the product of an orderly and logical 
deductive process rationally supported by substantial, 
competent evidence on the hearing record.”  Id. § 1179(d).  
Legal questions related to any such dispute are reviewed de 
novo.  Id. 
 
 C. The Audit 
 
 On March 31, 2007, the Escheator, through Kelmar, 
commenced an examination of Marathon and Speedway.  At 
                                              
8 We recently concluded that a corporation being 
audited by Kelmar had standing to bring a due process 
challenge based on the allegation that Kelmar had conflicts of 
interest.  Plains All Am. Pipeline LLC v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 
537 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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first, the audit concerned uncashed checks and payroll 
disbursement accounts.  Also under audit were paper gift 
certificates issued by Speedway, which are different from the 
stored-value gift cards at issue in this appeal.  Kelmar 
requested 35 years of “voluminous detailed financial 
records[.]”  (App. at 7.)  The Companies produced the 
requested documents.  Kelmar then “requested additional 
detailed information several separate times[.]”  (App. at 44.)   
In late 2012, more than five years into the audit process, 
Kelmar issued an Interim Status Report estimating liability of 
over $8 million for unredeemed gift certificates issued by 
Speedway from 1986 through 2000.  Speedway produced 
documents drawing Kelmar’s estimates into question, but 
Kelmar still issued a Report of Examination, concluding that 
Speedway owed that amount.  Speedway protested the 
estimated liability and challenged the methodology used to 
arrive at it.  Kelmar then requested “even more information 
related to the gift certificate program,” and Speedway 
complied.  (App. at 45.) 
 
Another three years passed and, in April 2015, Kelmar 
expanded its audit to include the stored-value gift cards at 
issue now, requesting “extensive detailed information” about 
the Ohio Subsidiaries.  (App. at 7.)  Marathon and Speedway 
responded by arguing that, since the Ohio Subsidiaries were 
Ohio corporations, Delaware lacked authority to escheat any 
sums associated with the unredeemed gift cards.  After having 
produced a selection of documents (including the governing 
contracts, articles of incorporation for the Ohio Subsidiaries, 
and W-2 forms for Speedway’s Ohio Subsidiary) to prove 
that the Ohio Subsidiaries were incorporated in Ohio and had 
no property in Delaware, the Companies objected to 
producing any further information.  Nevertheless, in October 
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2015, Kelmar sent a letter demanding further documentation.  
The Companies’ counsel then sent a letter to the State 
Escheator objecting to the requests and repeating the 
argument that Delaware lacked jurisdiction to inquire further.  
At the beginning of 2016, Kelmar sent another letter to 
Marathon and Speedway, this time threatening that 
“continued failure to provide the requested information will 
result in the Office referring the matter to the Attorney 
General’s Office for consideration of enforcement action.”  
(App. at 48.) 
 
 D. The Lawsuit 
 
Marathon and Speedway responded by filing a 
complaint in the District Court, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief.  They alleged that “any action by [the State] 
to enforce the request for documents is unlawful” because 
Delaware’s escheat law “violates and is preempted by the 
federal common law … by authorizing the State Escheator to 
claim purported unclaimed property that Delaware lacks 
standing to claim under federal law.”  (App. at 34.)  The 
Companies also asserted that the document requests 
constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.   
 
 Delaware filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, which the District Court granted, though it rejected 
Delaware’s argument that the case was not ripe.  The Court 
held instead that the interests of the parties were adverse and 
that a judgment would be conclusive and of practical utility to 
the parties.  More particularly, it noted that, even though 
Marathon and Speedway were “not currently the subject of an 
enforcement action, the aggressive and persistent nature of 
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[the] audit, in conjunction with [the] letter threatening referral 
to the Attorney General,” placed them in the difficult position 
of facing a lengthy audit or the risk of large penalties.  (App. 
at 13.)  The Court acknowledged “the real and detrimental 
effects of the audit process” and the impact of continued 
uncertainty.  (App. at 14-15.)  It also noted that a decision 
would be conclusive because Marathon and Speedway were 
challenging the legal authority of the State to conduct any 
audit at all into the gift cards.  Finally, the Court said that a 
decision would be of substantial utility because it would 
either stop the audit or pave the way for a battle over the 
scope of Delaware’s requests.   
 
 Turning to the merits of the preemption claim, the 
District Court concluded that the rules governing priority to 
escheat unclaimed property applied only to conflicting claims 
between states and not to disputes between a private party and 
a state.  Therefore, the preemption claim failed.  The Court 
also dismissed the Companies’ Fourth Amendment claim 
because there had been no compulsion to cooperate with the 
audit.  Marathon and Speedway have filed this timely appeal, 
challenging only the dismissal of their preemption claim.   
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II. DISCUSSION9 
 
This case poses several intertwined questions 
concerning Delaware’s power to search for revenue by 
auditing companies and escheating abandoned property.  The 
first, is whether, under the Supreme Court’s rules of priority, 
private parties have standing to challenge a state’s authority 
to conduct such an audit and escheat abandoned property.  
We conclude that they do.  The second question is whether 
Marathon’s and Speedway’s challenge to Delaware’s 
authority to conduct an audit is ripe, even though there has 
been no formal effort to compel cooperation.  We conclude 
that the challenge to the authority to audit is ripe but that any 
challenge to the scope of this specific audit is not.  Finally, 
we consider the merits of the one ripe dispute: whether, 
consistent with federal common law, Delaware can conduct 
                                              
9 Standing and ripeness are issues in this case, so our 
jurisdiction is in dispute.  See Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t 
of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (noting that ripeness “is 
drawn” at least in part “from Article III limitations on judicial 
power” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (emphasizing that “the 
core component of standing is an essential and unchanging 
part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III”).  
But, assuming that Marathon and Speedway have standing 
and that their claims are ripe, the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Our jurisdiction is then 
predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the 
District Court’s determination of jurisdiction, as well as its 
decision to grant Delaware’s motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.  Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
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an audit to determine whether abandoned property ostensibly 
held by Marathon’s and Speedway’s Ohio Subsidiaries is 
escheatable in Delaware. Before we delve into any of those 
issues, however, we begin with an overview of the governing 
precedent concerning a state’s authority to escheat abandoned 
property. 
 
A.  Escheat Priority and Preemption  
 
 Every state and the District of Columbia has a set of 
escheat laws, under which holders of abandoned property 
must turn such property over to the State “to provide for the 
safekeeping of abandoned property and then to reunite the 
abandoned property with its owner.”  N.J. Retail Merchs. 
Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2012).  
But, “in recent years, state escheat laws have come under 
assault for being exploited to raise revenue rather than” to 
safeguard abandoned property for the benefit of its owners.  
Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 536 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  Two Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
recently noted their concern that states are “doing less and 
less to meet their constitutional obligation to” reunite 
property owners with their property before seeking 
escheatment, even as they more aggressively go about 
classifying property as abandoned.  Taylor v. Yee, 136 S. Ct. 
929, 930 (2016) (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in 
the denial of certiorari) (discussing a challenge to California’s 
procedure for notifying property owners).  Delaware is “no 
exception[,] as unclaimed property has become Delaware’s 
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third-largest source of revenue[.]” 10  Plains All Am. Pipeline, 
866 F.3d at 536. 
 
Whether a state can properly escheat property is 
therefore often a high-stakes question.  “With respect to 
tangible property, real or personal, it has always been the 
unquestioned rule in all jurisdictions that only the State in 
which the property is located may escheat.”  Texas v. New 
Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965).  Intangible property, by 
comparison, presents a challenge because it cannot “be 
located on a map.”  Id.  Therefore, without clear rules 
governing which state is entitled to escheat abandoned 
intangible property, like a right to access funds through a gift 
card, states could – and often have – come into conflict.  
When that occurs, those who hold apparently abandoned 
property may be at risk of facing competing escheatment 
claims to that property, an obviously troubling proposition.  
See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 
(1961) (explaining that “the holder of … property is deprived 
of due process of law if he is compelled to relinquish it 
without assurance that he will not be held liable again in 
another jurisdiction”).  In response to those concerns, the 
Supreme Court, in a set of cases that we will call for 
convenience the “Texas trilogy” or the “Texas cases,” laid 
down the rules of priority governing the escheatment of 
intangible property. 
 
                                              
10 In fact, it has been pointed out that Delaware in 
particular “rel[ies] on decidedly old-fashioned methods [for 
providing notice of escheatment, methods] that are unlikely to 
be effective.”  Taylor v. Yee, 136 S. Ct. 929, 930 (2016) 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
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1. The Texas Trilogy 
 
  In Texas v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court took up 
the question of which among several competing states was 
entitled to escheat abandoned intangible property.  379 U.S. 
at 677.  At least four states wanted the money that backed 
uncashed checks held by the Sun Oil Company.  Id. at 675-
77.  Sun Oil, now widely known as Sunoco, was incorporated 
in New Jersey and had its principal offices and place of 
business in Pennsylvania.  Id. at 676.  Many of the people to 
whom the checks were issued were in Texas while others 
were in Florida or in parts unknown.  Id. at 675-77.  Texas 
sued New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Sunoco, and Florida 
moved to intervene.  Id.  All four states sought to escheat 
some or all of the money in question.  Id. at 676-77. 
 
The Supreme Court considered several possible rules 
to govern the order of priority among the states.  Id. at 678.  It 
emphasized the importance of adopting bright line rules 
rather than a test that would require case-by-case analysis.11  
Id. at 679-80.  Using the terms “debtor” and “creditor” to 
designate, respectively, the “holder” and the “owner” of 
                                              
11 The Court rejected the proposal to apply the “most 
significant contacts” test because applying that test “would 
serve only to leave in permanent turmoil a question which 
should be settled once and for all by a clear rule which will 
govern all types of intangible obligations like these and to 
which all [s]tates may refer with confidence.” Texas, 379 U.S. 
at 678.  For similar reasons, the Court rejected use of the 
debtor’s (i.e., the property holder’s) principal place of 
business.  Id. at 680. 
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unclaimed property,12 the Supreme Court granted first priority 
to the state of the last known address of the creditor, 
according to the debtor’s books and records.  Id. at 680-82.  
The Supreme Court emphasized that such a rule was fair 
because “a debt is property of the creditor, not of the 
debtor[.]”  Id. at 680.  Moreover, such a rule would involve 
factual questions that are “simple and easy to resolve.”  Id. at 
681.  And the rule would “tend to distribute escheats among 
the [s]tates in the proportion of the commercial activities of 
their residents …, rather than technical legal concepts of 
residence and domicile[.]”  Id. 
 
Having determined which state had first priority, the 
Supreme Court then considered which state should have 
priority when there is no record of any address for the 
creditor, or when the “last known address is in a [s]tate which 
does not provide for escheat of the property owed[.]”  Id. at 
682.  The Court concluded that in such cases the state of the 
debtor’s state of incorporation would be entitled to escheat 
the property.  Id. at 683.  The Court acknowledged that the 
“case could have been resolved otherwise.”  Id.  But it 
emphasized that “the rule [it] adopt[ed] is the fairest, is easy 
to apply, and in the long run will be the most generally 
acceptable to all the [s]tates.”  Id. 
 
In Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972), the 
Supreme Court considered in greater detail the situation in 
                                              
12 In the context of escheat, the holder of unclaimed 
property such as the money owed to the bearer of an uncashed 
check or a gift card is called a “debtor,” while the owner of 
the check or gift card is called a “creditor” because he is 
entitled to the money on demand. 
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which there is no record of the creditors’ addresses.  
Pennsylvania sought to escheat unclaimed funds from money 
orders purchased within the state, and, naturally, it argued 
that “the [s]tate where the money orders are bought should be 
presumed to be the [s]tate of the sender’s residence.”  Id. at 
209, 212.  The Court acknowledged that “Pennsylvania’s 
proposal has some surface appeal.”  Id. at 214.  
Notwithstanding that appeal, however, the Court said that not 
knowing where many of the creditors lived did not justify a 
departure from the rule laid down in Texas: “[T]o vary the 
application of the Texas rule according to the adequacy of the 
debtor’s records would require [us] to do precisely what we 
said should be avoided—that is, ‘to decide each escheat case 
on the basis of its particular facts or to devise new rules of 
law to apply to ever-developing new categories of facts.’”  Id. 
at 215 (quoting Texas, 379 U.S. at 679).  
 
Finally, in Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490 
(1993), the Court rejected any efforts to loosen or change the 
priority rules by broadening the concept of a property-holding 
“debtor,” id. at 502, or by allowing the state of the debtor’s 
principal place of business to escheat the property, id. at 506.  
The Court succinctly summarized the priority rules from 
Texas in three steps.  First, one must “determine the precise 
debtor-creditor relationship as defined by the law that creates 
the property at issue.”  Id. at 499.  “Second … the primary 
rule gives the first opportunity to escheat to the state of ‘the 
creditor’s last known address as shown by the debtor’s books 
and records.’”  Id. at 499-500 (quoting Texas, 379 U.S. at 
680-81).  “Finally, if the primary rule fails because the 
debtor’s records disclose no address for a creditor or because 
the creditor’s last known address is in a [s]tate whose laws do 
not provide for escheat, the secondary rule awards the right to 
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escheat to the [s]tate in which the debtor is incorporated.”  Id. 
at 500.  The Court thus reiterated the importance of “adhering 
to [its] precedent” to “resolve escheat disputes between 
[s]tates in a fair and efficient manner,” id. at 510, and 
explained that “[t]o craft different rules for the novel facts of 
each case would” result in “so much uncertainty and threaten 
so much expensive litigation” as to frustrate the power to 
escheat.  Id.  In addition, the Court explained that the Texas 
priority rules protect individuals from having their property 
interests “cut off or adversely affected by state action … in a 
forum having no continuing relationship to any of the parties 
to the proceedings.”  Id. at 504 (quoting Pennsylvania, 407 
U.S. at 213).  Accordingly, “no state may supersede [the 
rules] by purporting to prescribe a different priority under 
state law.”  Id. at 500.  Thus, throughout the Texas trilogy, the 
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of having bright-
lines rules for determining which state can escheat disputed 
property and preventing states without a recognized interest 
from staking a claim. 
 
2. New Jersey Retail Merchants 
 
Applying the guidance given in the Texas cases, our 
opinion in New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass’n v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, resolved a significant question that had been left 
unsettled, namely whether the priority rules set out by the 
Supreme Court are exclusive.  669 F.3d at 391-96.  In other 
words, if both of the two states empowered to escheat 
property under the Texas trilogy – i.e., the creditor’s last 
known state of residence and the debtor’s state of 
incorporation – are unwilling or unable to escheat the 
property, may another state attempt to do so?  We said no. 
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In New Jersey Retail Merchants, a variety of sellers of 
stored-value cards brought a challenge to New Jersey’s 
abandoned property law.  Reminiscent of the law at issue in 
Pennsylvania v. New York, the New Jersey law contained a 
place-of-purchase presumption whereby, if the address of a 
purchaser of a card was unknown, the law would presume the 
address to be the place where the stored-value card was 
purchased.  Id. at 394.  After reviewing the Texas trilogy, we 
concluded that New Jersey’s presumption was invalid 
because the State did “not have a sufficient connection with 
any of the parties to the transaction to claim a right to escheat 
the abandoned property.”  Id.  We explained that the Supreme 
Court’s “primary concern” in the Texas cases “was to clearly 
and definitively resolve disputes among states regarding the 
right to escheat abandoned property,” and that “allowing 
states to implement additional priority rules” was 
incompatible with that precedent and would create 
uncertainty.  Id. at 395-96.  Therefore, the two states allowed 
to escheat under the priority rules of the Texas cases are the 
only states that can do so. 
 
We thus expressly rejected New Jersey’s argument 
“that[,] without the place-of-purchase presumption, [debtors] 
that are incorporated in states that do not escheat abandoned 
property would unfairly have the right to retain the abandoned 
property.”  Id. at 395.  We said that that “potential of a 
windfall” did not justify departing from the rules set out by 
the Supreme Court.  Id. (relying on Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 
214). Moreover, since “a state’s power to escheat is derived 
from the principle of sovereignty,” a state is also entitled to 
choose not to escheat property.  Id.  “[S]tates may want to 
incentivize companies to incorporate in their jurisdiction by 
choosing not to escheat abandoned property.”  Id.  Efforts by 
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a state outside of the established rules of priority to escheat 
the property would be disrespectful to “the principle of 
sovereignty” and would effectively be an attempt to “force a 
state to escheat against its will.”  Id. 
 
The implications of New Jersey Retail Merchants for 
this case are clear.  If it is true, as Marathon and Speedway 
allege, that the Ohio Subsidiaries are the holders of the 
abandoned gift card money, then Delaware cannot escheat 
that money even though Ohio has disclaimed any interest in 
doing so.  And Delaware does not contest that conclusion.  
Indeed, it asserts that its law is fully consistent with the Texas 
trilogy and that it does not claim the right to escheat such 
property.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 1139-1141 (2017) 
(laying out when Delaware can escheat property in a manner 
compatible with the Texas trilogy).  Instead, the State argues 
that it is entitled to conduct an examination to determine if the 
money is in fact held by the Ohio Subsidiaries, an argument 
that we will turn to later.  First, however, we consider 
threshold questions of standing and ripeness. 
 
B.  Private Party Standing 
 
 The Texas cases involved states suing each other over 
escheatment rights.  Not surprisingly, then, the language of 
those decisions focuses on resolving claims among states.  
See, e.g., Texas, 379 U.S. at 679 (“[W]e are faced here with 
the ... problem of deciding which [s]tate’s claim to escheat is 
superior to all others.”).  The Supreme Court did not have 
occasion to determine whether a private party has standing to 
challenge a state’s application of the priority rules to escheat 
22 
 
property.13  As a result, a split has emerged on that question 
in opinions issuing from lower federal courts.  While there are 
                                              
13 Neither the parties nor the District Court framed 
Marathon’s and Speedway’s ability to bring suit as a question 
of standing.  Nevertheless, we address it as such because it 
fundamentally asks “who may bring the action.”  Presbytery 
of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 
1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Correct analysis in terms of 
ripeness tells us when a proper party may bring an action and 
analysis in terms of standing tells us who may bring the 
action.”); cf. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 556, 597 (D.N.J. 2010), order 
clarified (Jan. 14, 2011), aff’d sub nom. Am. Exp. Travel 
Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359 (3d 
Cir. 2012), and aff’d sub nom. New Jersey Retail Merchants 
Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(treating the issue of a private party’s ability to challenge a 
state’s escheat laws as a question of standing). 
Even if we frame the question as whether the federal 
common law escheatment scheme created in the Texas trilogy 
contains a private right of action, the primary inquiry remains 
one of standing.  Cf. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l 
Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 & n.17 (1981) (stating 
that certiorari was granted to determine “whether a private 
citizen has standing to sue for damages under the federal 
common law of nuisance[,]” but ultimately concluding that 
the Court did not need to address the issue because federal 
common law was replaced by federal statutes).  We do not 
believe the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014), 
counsels otherwise.  There, the Supreme Court said that “the 
zone-of-interests analysis, which asks whether ‘this particular 
23 
 
                                                                                                     
class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive 
statute[,]’” focuses on whether a party “has a cause of action 
under the statute” and requires application of “traditional 
principles of statutory interpretation.”  Id. at 1387-88.  
Lexmark clarified that, for those reasons, the zone-of-interests 
analysis is not a constitutional or prudential standing inquiry 
meant to ensure federal court jurisdiction but rather is a 
statutory question to be addressed on the merits.  See id. at 
1387 n.4 (indicating that “statutory standing” and “prudential 
standing” are not proper descriptions of the zone-of-interests 
analysis because “the absence of a valid (as opposed to 
arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter 
jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power 
to adjudicate the case’” (emphasis in original)); see also 
Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 805 F.3d 
98, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that “[t]he Court clarified [in 
Lexmark] that the zone-of-interests requirement goes to 
whether a particular plaintiff has a cause of action under a 
given law, not a plaintiff’s standing” and “Lexmark strongly 
suggests that courts shouldn’t link the zone-of-interests test to 
the doctrine of standing”). 
Here, the question does not involve a statute and is not 
resolvable using traditional tools of statutory interpretation.  
Instead, whether a private party has the right to invoke the 
federal common law crafted by the Supreme Court as a matter 
of its original jurisdiction in the Texas trilogy implicates our 
constitutional power to adjudicate the case at all.  In the 
absence of a private cause of action under federal common 
law to enforce the priority rules, there is no cognizable case 
or controversy over which a federal court may exercise its 
limited subject matter jurisdiction.  See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (concluding that “[28 U.S.C. §] 1331 
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plausible arguments on both sides, we conclude that the 
Supreme Court’s precedent does permit a private cause of 
action to enforce the priority rules. 
 
Our decision in New Jersey Retail Merchants, has 
already said as much, albeit by implication.  See generally 
669 F.3d 374.  The United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey had rejected the State of New Jersey’s 
argument that private parties were without standing to 
challenge the State’s escheat guidelines.  Am. Exp. Travel 
Related Servs. Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 556, 
597 (D.N.J. 2010), order clarified (Jan. 14, 2011), aff’d sub 
nom. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 2012), and aff’d sub nom. N.J. 
Retail Merchants Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  The district court emphasized that private parties 
have a significant interest in requiring compliance with the 
rules of priority.  Id. at 598.  If a stored value card issuer is 
incorporated in a state that does not escheat certain types of 
abandoned property, then that party is “entitled to retain the 
abandoned [property] when the address of the owner is 
unknown.”  Id. at 597.  Accordingly, any priority rules 
contrary to the Texas trilogy would “deprive[] corporations of 
the benefit of the secondary rule.”  Id. 
 
On appeal to us, the parties in New Jersey Retail 
Merchants fully briefed the question of private party standing 
to sue for enforcement of the Texas priority rules.  We 
affirmed on the merits, without discussing the question of 
standing or the right of private parties to bring suit, N.J. 
                                                                                                     
will support claims founded upon federal common law as 
well as those of a statutory origin”). 
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Retail Merchs., 669 F.3d at 400, but because the issue had 
been framed as a question of standing, our decision to address 
the merits certainly suggests that we accepted there was 
standing. 
 
In any event, even if our decision in that case had not 
effectively determined that a private party can enforce the 
Texas priority rules, we would come to that conclusion here.  
In Texas, the Supreme Court noted that the escheatment 
priority scheme it provided was the product of a particular 
need.  “Since the States separately are without constitutional 
power to provide a rule to settle this interstate controversy 
and since there is no applicable federal statute,” the Court 
said, “it becomes our responsibility in the exercise of our 
original jurisdiction to adopt a rule which will settle the 
question of which State will be allowed to escheat [the] 
intangible property.”  Texas, 379 U.S. at 677.  Nonetheless, 
the reasoning of the Texas cases is directly applicable to 
disputes between a private individual and a state.  The 
Supreme Court established those priority rules in part because 
subjecting individuals to the risk of “double liability” would 
violate the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 676; see also Standard 
Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951) (“The Full 
Faith and Credit Clause bars any … double escheat.”).  In 
other words, the priority rules were created not merely to 
reduce conflicts between states, but also to protect 
individuals.  See W. Union, 368 U.S. at 79 (noting that 
overlapping escheat inquiries “present[] problems of great 
importance to the [s]tates and persons whose rights will be 
adversely affected by escheats”). 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has strictly applied its 
priority rules to prevent “intangible property rights” from 
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“be[ing] cut off or adversely affected by state action … in a 
forum having no continuing relationship to any of the parties 
to the proceedings.”  Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 213 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Delaware, 507 U.S. at 504.  That 
concern for action by a state without a “continuing 
relationship” to the people whose property is at issue would 
make little sense if the Texas trilogy were solely concerned 
with the competing interests of states.  After all, a state with a 
superior interest could seek to recover property even after it 
has been escheated by another state.  See Texas, 379 U.S. at 
682 (noting that a state escheating property under the Texas 
trilogy “retain[s] the property for itself only until some other 
[s]tate comes forward with proof that it has a superior right to 
escheat”).  Additionally, one of the defendants in the original 
Texas case was in fact a private party, which strengthens the 
conclusion that such parties can sue to enforce the Texas 
priority rules.  See Texas, 379 U.S. at 675-76 (acknowledging 
that the Sun Oil Company was a party to the suit and had 
asked “to be protected from the possibility of double 
liability”).  It makes little sense to require a private party to 
wait to be sued by a state before that party can assert its 
rights.  If private parties may be defendants in disputes over 
the priority rules when their interests are at stake, they by 
rights should also be allowed to sue for enforcement of the 
priority rules to ensure protection of those same interests. 
 
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the District Court 
in this case relied on an earlier opinion from the District of 
Delaware, Temple-Inland, Inc. v. Cook, 82 F. Supp. 3d 539 
(D. Del. 2015).  The Temple-Inland court decided that the 
“Texas cases apply to disputes among [s]tates, not to disputes 
between private parties and [s]tates[.]”  Id. at 549.  It cited 
“the well-established principle that federal courts may not 
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ordinarily displace state law,” absent clear indications to the 
contrary.  Id. at 550.  We share the Temple-Inland court’s 
concern about turning ordinary matters of state law into 
questions of federal law.  But without a private cause of 
action, the Texas trilogy’s protections of property against 
escheatment would, in many instances, become a dead letter.  
Denying a private right of action would leave property 
holders largely at the mercy of state governments for the 
vindication of their rights.14  Making private rights contingent 
on state action would likewise undermine the Supreme 
Court’s goal of national uniformity, because whether an 
individual is protected would depend on whether a state 
brings suit to contest escheatment of the property.  Cf. Am. 
Petrofina Co. of Tex. v. Nance, 697 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 
(W.D. Okla. 1986) (concluding that private parties could 
enforce the Texas trilogy “because the decision was rendered 
as a result of the Supreme Court exercising its original 
jurisdiction and to ensure uniformity”), aff’d, 859 F.2d 840, 
842 (10th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with “the [district] court’s 
findings and conclusions on the preemption issue”).  
Therefore, we conclude that the Supreme Court’s desire for a 
                                              
14 Arguably, private parties would not be totally 
without recourse, even if we rejected a private cause of action 
to enforce the Texas trilogy.  Since the Due Process and Full 
Faith and Credit clauses protect individuals from being forced 
to pay the same property value to multiple states, a private 
party could seek legal relief to prevent additional states from 
claiming the same property.  That would not, however, 
protect a corporation from having its assets escheated in the 
first place, nor would it do anything to prevent overlapping 
and invasive examinations. 
28 
 
uniform and consistent approach to escheatment disputes 
indicates that a private right of action is fully appropriate.15 
 
Finally, allowing private parties to sue also provides 
secondary benefits that serve the public interest.  In protecting 
their own interests, private parties may also be aiding states in 
the maintenance of their sovereignty.  As we noted in New 
Jersey Retail Merchants, states are entitled to choose not to 
escheat property.  They may well choose to do so “to 
incentivize companies to incorporate in their jurisdiction.”  
N.J. Retail Merchs., 669 F.3d at 395.  Ohio could have made 
the decision to not exercise its power to escheat for precisely 
that reason, and Marathon and Speedway responded by 
choosing to incorporate their gift-card subsidiaries in Ohio.  If 
Marathon and Speedway cannot sue, then Ohio is wrongly 
placed in a dilemma.  It can either do nothing, allow the 
property of Ohio corporations to be seized by another state, 
and thus see the incentive to incorporate in Ohio being 
undermined, or it can engage in costly litigation to defend 
property it has no interest in escheating.16  Allowing private 
                                              
15 One of the benefits of the Texas trilogy is a clear set 
of rules that allows for “ease of administration.”  Texas, 379 
U.S. at 683.  Denying a private cause of action would make it 
easier for states outside of the line of priority to escheat 
property and would require the Supreme Court to exercise or 
delegate its original jurisdiction in a greater number of cases, 
undermining one of the chief benefits of the rules of priority. 
 
16 There is of course a third option – Ohio could 
change its laws to escheat the property itself.  But as we noted 
in New Jersey Retail Merchants, allowing one state to “force 
a[nother] state to escheat against its will” is in contravention 
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parties to sue thus provides a check against one state 
undercutting another’s decision not to escheat. 
 
Delaware argues against a private cause of action by 
saying it is unnecessary since a holder of abandoned property 
has no lawful interest in the funds.  From the Supreme Court 
opinion that bears its name, Delaware quotes the Court’s 
statement that “[f]unds held by a debtor become subject to 
escheat because the [holder] has no interest in the funds” and 
that “a law requiring the delivery of such [funds] to the [s]tate 
affects no property interest belonging to the [holder].”  
Delaware, 507 U.S. at 502.  Delaware reasons that if a holder 
has “no property interest” in the funds, the holder does not 
need to be able to enforce the Texas priority rules.  There is 
some precedent for that position.  For instance, the Texas 
Supreme Court has said that allowing Texas to escheat 
unclaimed property, even if the state would not have priority 
under the trilogy, would prevent an unjust windfall to those 
holding unclaimed property and would “bring the funds into 
the custody” of the state “where reports and procedures would 
be available” to allow “other [s]tates to learn of the funds and 
assert … any superior rights which they may claim.”  State v. 
Liquidating Trs. of Republic Petroleum Co., 510 S.W.2d 311, 
315 (Tex. 1974); see also Riggs Nat. Bank of Wash., D.C. v. 
District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1245 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1990) (concluding that Texas concerned only “the competing 
claims of different jurisdictions for escheat of the same 
property” and was silent with regard to “the relative rights to 
custody of abandoned property as between a private holder 
and a state”). 
                                                                                                     
of “the principle of sovereignty.”  N.J. Retail Merchs., 669 
F.3d at 395. 
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But that is, at bottom, the very argument we rejected in 
New Jersey Retail Merchants.  And adopting that position 
would leave us blind to reality.  In this case, there are no 
records indicating where the purchasers reside.  Ohio has 
disclaimed any interest in escheating abandoned gift card 
property.  That means the Ohio subsidiaries are entitled to 
keep the property (assuming that they have it) unless and until 
someone holding a gift card comes forward to claim the value 
of the card.  Delaware would have us shut our eyes and 
pretend that Marathon’s and Speedway’s very real entitlement 
to hold the property did not exist.  There is no persuasive 
precedent counseling that approach. 
 
C. Ripeness 
 
 Having decided that Marathon and Speedway have 
standing to raise their federal common law claim based on the 
Texas trilogy priority rules, we must next determine whether 
that claim presents a ripe “case[]” or “controvers[y].”  U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2.  The claim, as framed in the complaint, is 
that Delaware’s abandoned property laws are preempted to 
the extent they allow Delaware to inquire into and escheat 
property that could not be claimed under the Texas priority 
rules.  Based on that claim, the Companies seek both 
declaratory and injunctive relief. 
 
“[T]he contours of the ripeness doctrine” are 
particularly difficult to define “with precision” when a party 
seeks a declaratory judgment.  Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. 
Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 646 (3d Cir. 1990).  Yet, as we 
recently discussed in deciding Plains All American Pipeline, 
866 F.3d at 540, there are three key considerations that guide 
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our judgment: “the adversity of the interest of the parties, the 
conclusiveness of the judicial judgment[,] and the practical 
help, or utility, of that judgment.”  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 
647. 
 
Marathon’s and Speedway’s preemption claim is 
equivocal.  Read one way, the claim is not ripe; read another 
way, it is ripe but fails on the merits.  More specifically, to 
the extent the Companies question the scope and intensity of 
Delaware’s audit, that claim is not ripe at this time.  On the 
other hand, to the extent they argue that Delaware cannot 
even conduct an audit to verify the allegation that the 
abandoned property in question is held by the Ohio 
Subsidiaries, that is a ripe but meritless claim. 
 
 1. Challenge to the Scope of the Audit 
 
The first variation of the Companies’ claim – focusing 
on the scope and intensity of the audit – is like one we 
recently agreed was unripe in Plains All American Pipeline.  
The district court there rejected the claim on ripeness 
grounds, 201 F. Supp. 3d 547, 559 (D. Del. 2016), and we 
affirmed, with a limited exception not relevant here.17  The 
reasons for our affirmance are fully present now.  The 
Companies’ challenge is predicated on the speculative 
assumption that Delaware will ultimately attempt to escheat 
                                              
17 The plaintiff in Plains also argued that Kelmar’s 
involvement in the audit violated due process since Kelmar 
had a conflict of interest.  That claim could be resolved 
without factual development, and so we concluded that the 
District Court erred in dismissing it.  Plains All Am. Pipeline, 
866 F.3d at 545. 
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property that it is not entitled to escheat.  But at this point, 
Delaware has not even formally demanded compliance with 
the audit, so Marathon and Speedway are “not yet in a place 
where [they] must choose between submitting to the audit or 
facing penalties[.]”18  Plains All Am. Pipeline, 866 F.3d at 
542.  And even if Delaware makes a formal demand for 
documents, “the costs of administrative investigations are 
usually not sufficient, however substantial, to justify review 
in a case that would otherwise be unripe.”  Id.  Moreover, the 
validity of Delaware’s audit may “turn largely on how it is 
enforced,” and also on the question of who in fact is the 
holder of the property, suggesting that a decision at this time 
would be inconclusive and lacking in practical utility absent 
further factual development.  Id. at 544. 
 
To be sure, Marathon and Speedway make troubling 
accusations about Delaware’s escheat auditing process.  And 
those allegations are supported by the thorough opinion in 
Temple-Inland, Inc. v. Cook, 192 F. Supp. 3d 527, 527 (D. 
Del. 2016).  The court in that case noted that Kelmar, the 
State’s contract auditor, had “relie[d] heavily on property 
escheatable only to other states to increase the amount of 
unclaimed property owed to Delaware.”  Id. at 537.  
Accordingly, Marathon and Speedway have good reason to be 
concerned that Delaware may claim property that it is not 
entitled to escheat, placing them “at risk of multiple liability.”  
                                              
18 While there are factual differences between this case 
and Plains, for instance, the fact that an audit has been 
ongoing for several years in this case and was in its infancy in 
Plains, those differences do not alter the critical fact that 
Delaware has as yet taken no formal steps to compel 
cooperation with its audit of Marathon and Speedway. 
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Id. at 541.  In addition, if Delaware’s examination process 
proves in this case to be “a game of ‘gotcha’ that shocks the 
conscience,’” id. at 550, as it did in Temple-Inland, then 
Marathon and Speedway are justified in their fear that 
Delaware will draw out the audit and continue to find new 
reasons for a prolonged investigation.  And Kelmar’s 
financial incentive to claim as much escheatable property as 
possible taints the entire process with an appearance of self-
interested overreaching.  Nevertheless we cannot ignore that, 
at this junction, Marathon and Speedway are effectively in 
control: they can simply refuse to cooperate. 
 
We are also cognizant of the availability of state law 
remedies if Delaware does make a formal demand for 
documents.  In light of recent amendments to Delaware’s 
abandoned property laws, there are some unanswered 
questions that bear on the audit.19  As a matter of comity, it 
would be well if Delaware had the opportunity to address 
                                              
19 Indeed, a proposed Abandoned or Unclaimed 
Property Reporting and Examination Manual was recently 
before the public for notice and comment.  It concerns, 
among other things, the estimation methods that the Escheator 
is entitled to use, record retention requirements, and the 
process for requesting an expedited examination.  Delaware 
Department of Finance, Public Notice 104 Department of 
Finance Abandoned or Unclaimed Property Reporting and 
Examination Manual, http://regulations.delaware.gov/register/ 
august2017/proposed/21%20DE%20Reg%20123%2008-01-
17.pdf. 
 
34 
 
those issues in the first instance.20  So, even if this challenge 
were ripe, we might “decline jurisdiction over a declaratory 
                                              
20 We encourage Marathon and Speedway to take 
advantage of state remedies.  But, while we do not decide the 
matter here, we note that challenging the audit in state court 
may bar a subsequent challenge in a federal district court.  If 
the Companies bring their state law and federal law claims in 
state court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may prevent the 
District Court from entertaining an attempt to relitigate those 
claims.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine prevents federal district courts from exercising 
jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers 
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced 
and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments”).  And to the extent Rooker-Feldman and 28 
U.S.C. § 1257 do not “stop a district court from exercising 
subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to 
litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state 
court[,]” primarily because the “federal plaintiff ‘present[s] 
some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal 
conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he 
was a party[,]’” id. at 293 (second alteration in original), 
preclusion doctrine may bar that subsequent independent 
claim from being heard in federal district court.  Nevertheless, 
we do not at this time opine on the potential preclusive impact 
of a state court judgment because that issue depends on an 
interpretation of state law and, in any event, is not before us.  
See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 
(1986) (“[A] federal court must give the same preclusive 
effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that State 
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judgment action” to allow the state court system an 
opportunity to resolve those questions of state law.21  See 
Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 
2014) (concluding that it was not abuse of discretion for the 
district court to decline jurisdiction over a declaratory 
judgment action because state law issues “peculiarly within 
the purview of the [state] court system” were raised).  In any 
                                                                                                     
would give.”).  Finally, we are not saying anything about 
whether Marathon and Speedway are required to raise their 
federal complaints in state court.  Cf. Bradley v. Pittsburgh 
Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1071 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing 
the requirements for the reservation of federal issues when a 
party is forced to litigate a claim in state court). 
 
21 Our discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
is “not limited” by the parameters of a “more limited doctrine 
of abstention” such as Burford or Colorado River Abstention.  
United States v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 
923 F.2d 1071, 1074 (3d Cir. 1991).  When a claim for 
injunctive relief is “dependent on declaratory claims,” we also 
“retain[] discretion to decline jurisdiction of the entire 
action[.]”  Rarick v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 223, 
229 (3d Cir. 2017).  That is the case here, as entry of 
injunctive relief would require us to thoroughly examine 
Delaware’s unclaimed property laws to determine the extent 
to which a potential conflict with the Texas priority rules is 
possible.  (See App. at 55 (requesting that the District Court 
“[d]eclar[es] that the DUPL violates and is preempted by the 
federal common law established in the Texas Cases”).)  Since 
the preemption claim cannot “be adjudicated without the 
requested declaratory relief,” we have the discretion to 
decline to hear it.  Rarick, 852 F.2d at 228 (citation omitted). 
36 
 
event, a challenge to the scope of Delaware’s audit is not 
properly before us at this time. 
 
2.  Challenge to Delaware’s Auditing  
 Authority 
 
If one considers the Companies’ claim, as the District 
Court did, to be a challenge to Delaware’s authority to 
conduct any audit at all, then this case is distinguishable from 
Plains. “[T]he adversity of the interest of the parties, the 
conclusiveness of [a] judicial judgment and the practical help, 
or utility, of [a] judgment” would all then favor resolving 
Marathon’s and Speedway’s complaint.  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d 
at 647.  In Plains, the claim was not that “Delaware lacks the 
authority to conduct its audit.”  Plains All Am. Pipeline, 866 
F.3d at 542.  When the claimed injury “is the process itself,” 
Sayles Hydro Assocs. v. Maughan, 985 F.2d 451, 454 (9th 
Cir. 1993), in the manner it is here, then the interests of the 
parties are clearly adverse.  Cf. Freehold Cogeneration 
Assocs., L.P. v. Bd. of Regulatory Comm’rs of State of N.J., 
44 F.3d 1178, 1188 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding in a different 
context that a preemption claim could proceed “[i]n light of 
the ongoing proceedings before” a regulatory agency).22  
                                              
22 Delaware argues that since its “law provides 
Marathon protection from the risk of double liability,” there is 
no real risk of injury and no true adversity.  (Ans. Br. at 29.)  
It points to a section of the Delaware Code which provides 
that “[i]f a holder pays or delivers property to the State 
Escheator in good faith and thereafter ... another state claims 
the money or property ... , the State Escheator, acting on 
behalf of the State, upon written notice of the claim, shall 
defend the holder against the claim and indemnify the holder 
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Likewise, any judgment we issue regarding the authority to 
audit will be conclusive because it “definitively would decide 
the parties’ rights.”  NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG 
Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 344 (3d Cir. 2001).  If 
Delaware is not entitled to even ask the Companies for 
information, then the audit is effectively at an end.  
Accordingly, a decision would be of real practical value to the 
parties, since a judgment would “clarify [the] legal 
relationships so that plaintiffs (and … defendants) could 
make responsible decisions about the future.”  Step-Saver, 
912 F.2d at 649.  In short, to the extent that Marathon and 
Speedway are challenging the authority of Delaware to 
conduct an audit, that claim can be addressed now. 
 
D.  Delaware’s Auditing Authority  
 
Marathon and Speedway argue that Delaware has 
abused its examination authority and violated the Texas 
trilogy by conducting an audit into property that is not 
escheatable.  In essence, they say that Delaware must take 
them at their word and cannot inquire into their books and 
                                                                                                     
against any liability on the claim.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, 
§ 1153(c) (2017).  But despite the promise of indemnification, 
a party subject to escheat investigations still incurs the costs 
of a lengthy inquiry, the risk of penalties based on the failure 
to comply, and the risk of overlapping inquiries by other 
states.  Though the costs of complying with an administrative 
investigation will not typically create a ripe dispute where 
none exists, see supra p. 27, their existence is a meaningful 
rebuttal to Delaware’s indemnification argument.  The State 
cites no authority for its claim that a duty to indemnify 
negates ripeness. 
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records to see if the property belongs to them or the Ohio 
Subsidiaries. 
 
We disagree.  The Texas cases do not prevent 
Delaware from examining books and records to determine the 
true holder of abandoned property.  To the contrary, the 
Supreme Court has noted that the first step in determining the 
right to escheat property involves a “determin[ation] [of] the 
precise debtor-creditor relationship as defined by the law that 
creates the property at issue.”  Delaware, 507 U.S. at 499.  By 
requesting an opportunity to look at the books and records of 
Marathon and Speedway and their Ohio Subsidiaries, 
Delaware is seeking information that it says will help make 
that determination.  It is possible that once the debtor-creditor 
and parent-subsidiary relationships have been fairly 
examined, Delaware may determine that some portion of the 
property is actually held by Marathon and Speedway rather 
than the Ohio Subsidiaries and is therefore subject to 
escheatment in Delaware.  At the very least, that is not an 
illegitimate basis for an appropriately targeted audit.23 
                                              
23 Marathon and Speedway rely heavily on language 
from NE Hub to argue that preemption is required in this 
case.  See NE Hub, 239 F.3d at 348 (“[I]f it is evident that the 
result of a process must lead to conflict preemption, it would 
defy logic to hold that the process itself cannot be 
preempted[.]”).  However, in NE Hub, we expressly warned 
that our opinion “should not be overread.”  Id. at 349 n.18.  
The language from NE Hub that the Companies cite does not 
apply here.  We are not focused on Delaware’s auditing 
process itself.  We are discussing in the abstract the ability of 
the State to audit, and we have concluded that Delaware’s 
ability to conduct an examination is not directly contrary to 
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The Companies argue that Delaware is entitled only to 
look within the four corners of their contracts with their Ohio 
Subsidiaries but no further.  (See Opening Br. at 42 (arguing 
that all that is needed is “simple contract interpretation.”).)  
Because the contracts state that the Ohio Subsidiaries are 
ultimately responsible for the gift cards, Marathon and 
Speedway say the case is closed.  (See Oral Arg. Tr. at 10 
(positing that “there can be no further inquiry” by the State 
after a contract is shown).)  But the Texas trilogy does not 
stand for the proposition that states must ignore anything 
beyond the pages of a contract.  “[D]etermining the precise 
debtor-creditor relationship,” Delaware, 507 U.S. at 499, may 
at times be a fact-based inquiry into whether the formalities 
of corporate separateness have been observed, not just in 
                                                                                                     
the Texas trilogy, and at times such an examination may even 
be necessary under the first step of the Supreme Court’s 
three-step test.  Whether the specific process Delaware 
employs to conduct its audits, and the result of that process, 
are preempted is not decided today because that issue is not 
ripe. 
Instead, other language in NE Hub is instructive.  In 
that case, we also said, “it would be entirely logical in an 
appropriate case to hold that the process is not preempted but 
to hold later that the result of the process is preempted.”  Id. 
at 348.  This is “an appropriate case,” id., where we have 
concluded that the ability to have a process is not preempted, 
without saying anything about the result or specifics of the 
process as actually carried out.  Of course, none of this should 
be taken to suggest that Delaware is free to use a “we’re just 
trying to define the debtor-creditor relationship” rationale as a 
pass for abusive auditing practices. 
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theory but in practice.  Cf. Pearson v. Component Tech. 
Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
test for determining if one corporation is merely an alter ego 
involves consideration of a variety of factual questions such 
as the “nonpayment of dividends” or the “nonfunctioning of 
officers and directors”); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 
910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (determining whether a parent 
corporation is an operator of a subsidiary by examining a 
variety of factual matters such as the existence of overlapping 
directors and officers).24 
 
According to Marathon’s and Speedway’s rendering of 
the law, a corporation can avoid an audit or any other inquiry 
merely by setting up a shell company.  All the corporation 
needs is a well-worded contract.  And Delaware indeed 
alleges that some corporations have been taking exactly that 
route to hide abandoned property.  See State ex rel. French v. 
Card Compliant, LLC, No. N13C-06-289PRWCCLD, 2017 
WL 1483523, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2017) 
(discussing Delaware’s argument that a number of the State’s 
corporate citizens had “attempted to cheat Delaware out of its 
portion of unused gift card balances via use of out-of-state 
‘shell’ entities devised to hold [those] funds”), interlocutory 
appeal refused sub nom. French v. Ruth’s Hosp. Grp., Inc., 
No. 205, 2017, 2017 WL 2290067 (Del. May 23, 2017).  We 
do not read the Texas trilogy as foreclosing a state’s right to 
                                              
24 At oral argument, Marathon and Speedway took the 
position that doctrines such as piercing the corporate veil, 
which allow courts to disregard corporate forms in the face of 
fraud, are inapplicable in the escheat context.  (Oral Arg. Tr. 
at 19-20.)  We know of no basis for that assertion and the 
Companies have certainly not provided one. 
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conduct an appropriate examination to determine if there is 
fraud or another basis for determining that property may be 
escheated, even if a contract viewed in isolation might 
suggest otherwise.  Marathon’s and Speedway’s argument to 
the contrary is unpersuasive and we reject it. 
 
Our decision today does not, however, foreclose the 
possibility that a state’s demands for information may 
become so obviously pretextual or insatiable, and the record 
so clearly developed, that “it is evident that the result of [the] 
process must lead to conflict preemption[.]” NE Hub, 239 
F.3d at 348.  In such circumstances, “it would defy logic to 
hold that the process itself cannot be preempted.”  Id.  When 
an audit process drags beyond a legitimate inquiry into 
whether subsidiary companies are in fact bona fide, separate 
entities, the priority rules may be triggered and the State’s 
audit process preempted.  Determining the difference between 
a state’s legitimate inquiry into a parent-subsidiary 
relationship, on the one hand, and, on the other, an abusive 
process designed to force a monetary settlement, may not 
always be a simple matter.  Hard or not, though, it will have 
to be done and, in the event, the effort will likely be guided in 
part by asking whether the state has gone past what is needed 
to address familiar standards used to distinguish bona fide 
subsidiaries from mere alter egos.  See, e.g., Maloney-Refaie 
v. Bridge at Sch., Inc., 958 A.2d 871, 881 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(reciting the factors that guide alter ego analysis under 
Delaware law); Island Seafood Co. v. Golub Corp., 759 
N.Y.S.2d 768, 769-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (same with 
respect to New York law); Lumax Indus. v. Aultman, 669 
A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995) (same with respect to Pennsylvania 
law). 
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At some point, consistent application of the Texas 
trilogy’s priority rules may require the adoption of a uniform 
federal standard for determining corporate separateness.  Cf. 
Texas, 379 U.S. at 677 (indicating that the priority scheme 
was developed as a matter of federal common law); United 
States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 87-89 (3d Cir. 1981) (crafting a 
federal common law alter ego test for determining personal 
liability under the federal Medicare statute); United States v. 
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979) (supporting 
adoption of a uniform federal common law rule when state 
law would frustrate specific objectives of a federal scheme, a 
need for national uniformity exists, and a federal rule would 
not disrupt commercial relationships founded upon state law).  
But that is an issue for another day.  It is enough for now to 
note that there is well developed law on that subject under 
various state and federal precedents.  The only question 
properly before us today is whether Delaware has the 
authority to dig for information about who, a parent or a 
subsidiary, is the true holder of escheatable funds, and the 
answer to that is plainly yes.  The preemption claim brought 
by Marathon and Speedway is otherwise unripe and subject to 
dismissal. 
 
E. Dismissal Shall Be Without Prejudice 
 
Even though we agree with the District Court’s 
determination to dismiss the preemption claim, we will 
nevertheless vacate and remand so that the Court can clarify 
that the claim is dismissed without prejudice.  See Presbytery 
of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 
1454, 1461 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that dismissals for lack of 
justiciability are ordinarily without prejudice).  While the 
challenge to the scope of the audit is not now ripe, it is 
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possible that Marathon and Speedway will have a viable 
claim in that regard at a later date.   
 
 III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment and remand with instructions to enter an 
order of dismissal of Marathon’s and Speedway’s preemption 
claim that is without prejudice to it being revived at a later 
date, if appropriate. 
 
